Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
For noncooperative games with mean field coupling, the Nash Certainty Equivalence (NCE) methodology developed in our past work [11] , [14] , [15] , [12] , [13] provides an effective analytical tool for obtaining decentralized individual strategies. The key idea of this methodology is to specify a certain consistency relationship between the individual strategies and the mass effect (i.e., the overall effect of the population on a given agent) within the population limit, and each decision-maker can ignore the fine details of the behavior of any other individual player by only focusing on the overall impact of the population. This procedure leads to decentralized strategies for the individual players in a large but finite population. For this class of game problems, a closely related approach has recently been independently developed by Lasry and Lions [19] , [20] , while for models of many firm industry dynamics, Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy proposed the notion of oblivious equilibrium by use of a mean field approximation [24] , [25] . For the analysis of mean field models in the setting of mathematical physics, see [7] , [23] . To see the rich economic backgrounds of noncooperative games with many players, the reader is referred to [17] , [9] , [8] , [18] and references therein.
Although mean field models in their usual uniform aggregation form have a broad scope of application [3] , [6] , [18] , [20] , [11] , they may be unable to capture structural properties in certain problems. For instance, in a vaccination mean field model, each person assesses his or her infection risk and as a rough approximation may simply refer to the vaccination M. Huang is with School of Mathematics and Statistics, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada. mhuang@math.carleton.ca.
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coverage of the overall population [3] , [6] , but in reality, the different sub-populations around the respective individuals may differently impact each person. It is obvious that an individual's close friends, colleagues (or classmates) have a much higher immediate influence than those more distant in a social and physical sense. A similar situation arises in economic models. In a crowded business area, a service unit (such as a retail store, restaurant) and its nearby neighbors may strongly interact while the level of such interactions decreases with distance.
It is worthwhile briefly reviewing the extent to which game theory has dealt with the issue of locality. Blume [5] considered strategic interactions on lattice models as motivated by retailing services. Schelling [22] presented a simple line topology to examine social segregation phenomena when each agent attempts to move to a more favorable location. Despite the fact they involve very different contexts, a common feature of the above works is their investigation of the relationship between microscopic local behavior of individual agents and the resulting macroscopic phenomena (also see, e.g., [10] , [21] , [4] ).
Motivated by these problems, we present here a generalized mean field version of the Nash Certainty Equivalence theory of our previous work (see [11] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [12] ) which now takes into account the possibility of the local nature of agent interactions. Our approach still relies on identifying a certain consistency relationship between each individual and the mass effect but the latter may now be specific to individual agents.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The individual dynamics and costs are introduced in Section II where the uniform aggregate cost coupling [11] , [12] is also briefly reviewed for comparison purposes. Section III presents the equilibrium analysis for the set of control laws calculated via the NCE equation system, and we also identify some novel features for such locality based interactions by showing an interaction radii collapse effect when the population size increases in a lattice locality model. In Section IV, we extend the NCE equation system and the equilibrium analysis to models with different sub-populations where the cost involves inter-and intra-group coupling. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAME MODEL
In a population of N agents, consider the dynamics for an individual agent 
A. The NCE Principle with Mean Field Cost Coupling
We begin by giving a brief review of our previous modeling of cost coupling. The cost function is given as
where ρ > 0 is a discount factor, 
Denote
To simplify the aggregation procedure we assume zero initial mean for all agents, i.e., Ez i (0) = 0, i ≥ 1. Also, we assume we are in the uniform case where all agents have the same dynamic parameter a in their dynamics. The NCE consistency requirement leads to the equation system:
wherez a (0) = 0 corresponds to the zero initial mean assumption. See [11] , [12] , [14] for details on the construction of this equation system in an LQG context. In fact, the NCE equation system may take a more general form where a varies across the population and possesses an empirical distribution; see [12] . Under some mild assumptions, the equation system (3)-(5) admits a unique bounded solution (s a (·),z a (·)). The function s a (t) is uniquely determined by its boundedness condition and it is unnecessary to state the initial condition s a (0) separately. In fact,z a (t) and s a (t) may be given in an explicit form (see [14] ). Let u 0 i denote the control law
which may be interpreted as the optimal tracking control law with respect to z * in place of Φ i (z (N) ) in (1) . It has been shown that the set of control laws {u 0 i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} results in an ε-Nash equilibrium where the offset ε → 0 when N → ∞. The formal definition of an ε-Nash equilibrium will be given in Section III; also see [2] .
B. The NCE Principle with Agent Specific Cost Interactions
We now generalize the basic NCE equation system to the case of agent specific cost coupling. To this end, we assign each agent with a "locality" (or "spatial") index rather than just use an integer i to label its state variable z i . The dynamic parameter a and the locality parameter α are completely independent of one another, and for simplicity, in the initial case discussed in this paper, explicit mention of a is suppressed. Note that this locality index may have different interpretations and is not necessarily restricted to be a physical location. For instance, it may be used to measure to what extent the player in question is distanced from other players, and it may be used in a social interaction context [1] . We assume agent i within the N agents is assigned the locality parameter p i .
Let the cost for the ith agent be given by
For each fixed i, it is seen from (8) that the total weight of unit is allocated to all the N agents. In order to simplify the notation, the summation in (8) includes the index i itself. Whether or not this self-weight is included has no impact on our asymptotic analysis when N → ∞. We take a representative agent and let its locality parameter be denoted by α which takes a value from a compact interval [α, α]. The state process of this agent may be denoted by z α (t), and we denote its mean trajectory by z α (t) = Ez α (t), where t ≥ 0. For illustration, suppose agent i has p i = α; then z i (t) may be identified as z α (t).
For the agent associated with the parameter α (this agent may be referred to as an α-agent), let its limiting weight allocation for α ′ ∈ [α, α] be described by a probability distribution F α (α ′ ) when the number N of agents goes to infinity. Thus, F α (α ′ ) is intended to reflect the following approximation within a large population:
Later on we will specify related conditions.
is a probability distribution function for each fixed α,
(A2) The constant β 1 > 0 and (γb 2 )/(rβ 1 β 2 ) < 1.
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For the given α-agent, it faces the aggregate effect of other agents described bȳ
Now, based on the individual and weighted mass interaction consistency relationship, we can derive the following new Nash Certainty Equivalence (Mean Field) (NCE) equation system
The interesting observation is that when the distribution function F α (·) does not change with α, the equation system (9)- (12) reduces to (3)- (5) with standard mean-field coupling without differentiation between neighbors. This holds since in this caser α and hence R α are both independent of α (see Acknowledgements). The system (9)- (12) is constructed such that an α-agent makes optimal tracking of the local mass effect R α which, in turn, depends on locality related coupling. Equation (10) 
The two expressions f (α,t) and f α (t) will be used interchangeably.
For each α, ifr α is given, we may solve a unique bounded s α from (9) to obtain:
We also writer α (t) =r(α,t). Next,
where Γ 0 is viewed as an operator acting on bounded continuous functions on [0, ∞). Finally,
Note that for a general function f (α,t) ∈ C b [I × R + ], Γ 0 f α and Γ f are defined in an obvious manner.
In order to solve the NCE equation system (9)- (12), a key step is to find a fixed pointr in a suitable function space for the operator recursion corresponding to the equation (Γr)(α,t) =r(α,t).
(13)
Proof: See appendix. Theorem 2: Under (A1)-(A2), there exists a unique bounded solution (s α (·),z α (·), r α (·)) to the NCE equation system (9)- (12) .
Proof: By Lemma 1, we see that Γ is a linear operator from C b [I × R + ] to itself, and C b [I × R + ] is a Banach space under the norm | f | = sup α,t | f (α,t)|.
We take
. By straightforward calculation, we obtain the estimates
By (A2) it follows that Γ is a contraction. So there is a unique solutionr ∈ C b [I × R + ] satisfying equation (13) . Once the abover(=r α (t)) is obtained, it is straightforward to get the other two entries in the triple (s α (t),z α (t),r α (t)).
Uniqueness of the solution can be easily verified by using uniqueness of the fixed point to equation (13) .
III. THE EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
For equilibrium analysis, we need the assumptions: (A3) The weight allocation satisfies the condition
is associated with a distribution function F p i (x) (specified in ( 
where λ ∈ [0, 1] and c i = ∑ N j=1, j =i | j − i| −λ is the normalizing factor.
With such a choice of λ in Example 1, (A3) can be verified by elementary calculations. The mean field model of the uniform aggregation form corresponds to taking λ = 0 47th IEEE CDC, Cancun, Mexico, Dec. [9] [10] [11] 2008 ThC14.2 for which case the weight assignment does not distinguish locations. If λ = 1, we can also show that (A4) is satisfied and in this case
We have the key approximation lemma. 
Proof: See appendix.
A. Discussion on the "Interaction Radii Collapse" Effect
It appears that by use of the simple weight allocation model (14) some very intriguing phenomena may be shown to be possible. We fix p 1 = 0. By simple calculation we can see that the associated function F p 1 (as a weak limit) will have very different nature. When λ = 1, F p 1 is just a Heaviside function with a unit jump at x = 0. If we go back to the NCE equation system, it means in the limit model, only the agents in an infinitesimally small neighborhood matter for the agent in question. Consequently and surprisingly, we can retrieve the usual NCE equation. When λ ∈ [0, 1), we can show that F p 1 is a continuous function connecting (0, 0) and (1, 1) via its graph. This means the effect of agents in a large range can be registered by this limit distribution function F p 1 and then utilized in the NCE equation system. So, λ can be interpreted as some kind of critical parameter.
B. Properties of the NCE Based Control Laws
Within the context of a population of N agents, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N, the kth agent's admissible control set U k consists of all feedback controls u k adapted to the σ -algebra σ (z i (τ), τ ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N) (i.e., u k (t) is a function of (t, z 1 (t), · · · , z N (t))) such that a unique strong solution to the closed-loop system of the N agents exists on [0, ∞). Note that U k itself is not restricted to be decentralized. Denote
Definition 4: A set of controls u k ∈ U k , 1 ≤ k ≤ N, for N players is called an ε-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
is applied by the ith player. Theorem 5: Under (A1)-(A4), given any ε > 0, there exists N ε such that for all N ≥ N ε , the set of control strategies {û i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is an ε-Nash equilibrium wherê
and s p i is given by (9)- (12) via the substitution α = p i in s α . Proof: Letz α be given by (9)-(12). Denote
We first write the individual cost in the form
Suppose all the N agents apply the controlsû i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. Then it is straightforward to find a constant C such that
In the below, when we consider alternative strategies for agent i, we may restrict that u i satisfies
This restriction causes no loss of generality since, otherwise, u i will generate a cost higher than J i (û i ,û −i ). Based on (15), we may further show that E
By using (A1) to show thatz α (t) has equicontinuity in α (w.r.t. all t), we can apply Lemma 3 to check that
Also, for all u i satisfying the prior bound (15), we use (A3) to show the convergence relation
when all other agents' strategies are given byû −i . Finally, for u i satisfying (15) , by use of (16)- (17) it is straightforward to show that
where 0 ≤ ε N = o (1) . By the choice of C, we see that (18) is automatically true when u i does not satisfy (15) . This completes the proof.
IV. COST COUPLING WITH HETEROGENOUS SUB-POPULATIONS
In this section, we adapt the general cost structure (7) to model the interaction of agents from K groups within the population. The locality parameter p i indicates which group the ith agent belongs to, and the cost interaction for a pair of agents is determined by either the inter-group or the intra-group coupling parameters. Suppose there is a finite set Θ {θ 1 , · · · , θ K } (of distinct elements) such that each p i , 1 ≤ i < ∞, takes values from Θ. The coupling weight assignment will be constructed by using the K × K matrix
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(A5) The sequence {p i , 1 ≥ 1} has the limit empirical distribution
The probability vector (π θ 1 , · · · , π θ K ) shows the relative frequency of each of the K groups. Now the NCE equation system takes the form:
where θ ∈ Θ and, again, s θ (t) is restricted to be a bounded function without the necessity of separately specifying an initial condition s θ (0).
Proof: The theorem may be proved using a fixed point argument.
Theorem 7: Under (A5) and the assumptions of Theorem 6, given any ε > 0, there exists N ε such that for all N ≥ N ε , the set of control strategies {û i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is an ε-Nash equilibrium whereû
and s p i is given by (20)- (23) via the substitution θ = p i in s θ .
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we generalize our previous Nash Certainty Equivalence methodology with uniform coupling to models with locality interactions. We show that under reasonable decay rates for the interaction strength, a consistency relationship between individual strategies and local deterministic mass effects can still be specified, and this procedure leads to decentralized Nash strategies for the individual players. We also discuss how the weight allocation in the cost coupling affects the spatial spreading ability of interactions in the population limit, and we illustrate a novel interaction radii collapse phenomenon when the weight decay approaches a critical rate.
By the boundedness of f α (t), there exists C < ∞ such that
Now we prove the continuity of Γ f . We note the relation:
Now it suffices to show the continuity of G(α,t) with respect to (α,t). Letting (α,t) be fixed, we pick (α 1 ,t 1 ) in a neighborhood of (α,t). Then
We have
where we may take C = (sup α,t | f α (t)|)/(β 1 β 2 ).
For each fixed t, sup α ′ |G(α ′ ,t)| < ∞ and by elementary estimates we can show that G 0 (α ′ ,t) is a continuous function of α ′ . Hence it follows from (A1) that 
Denoting C g = sup x |g(x)|, hence
On the other hand, for the above fixed pair of (ε, l), there exists N ε,l > 0 depending on (ε, l) such that when N ≥ N ε,l . Therefore, for all N ≥ N ε,l , we have
By the arbitrariness of ε, the lemma follows.
